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ABSTRACT 
Illegal immigration is a serious concern of countries neighboring devastated parts of the 
modern world. Illegal migrants dreaming of a new life follow perilous routes, cooperating 
with smuggling networks. For a significant portion, their dream never comes true. 
Besides, smugglers are also responsible for other illegal activities, such as drugs and 
weapons trafficking. 
Greece not only faces the problem of absorbing these immigrants from Africa and 
Greater Middle East countries, but it also has no chance to filter those migrants involved 
in dark networks. The Hellenic Coast Guard, lacking timely information on suspect 
vessels moving towards its territorial waters in the Eastern Aegean Sea, strives to be in 
the right place at the right time. 
The need for an ever-present adaptive networking system able to provide reliable 
communication and sensor data to and from the areas of responsibility is more profound 
than ever.   
This thesis examines the feasibility and constraints of applying modern 
networking technology, already successfully tested by NPS CENETIX TNT/test bed, on 
Aegean Sea islands as a concept of providing information to the Hellenic Coast Guard  to 
enhance situational awareness and decision-making capability and thus increase overall 
effectiveness and efficiency while carrying out missions in that area.  
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 Associated Press: Athens, Greece, 27 October 2009—“A small boat loaded with 
Afghan families smashed onto the rocks and sank off an island in the Aegean Sea on 
Tuesday, causing three immigrant women and five children to drown…”  
Quite often deadly accidents highlight the plight of thousands of migrants who 
risk their lives every year to reach the European Union. Greece, and particularly its 
islands in the Aegean Sea—due to their proximity to the Turkish shoreline, is considered 
to be a primary entry point for illegal immigrants coming from Africa and Greater Middle 
East (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Greek Aegean Sea Islands (From Google-Images) 
 Illegal migrants, facilitated by smugglers aboard small, overcrowded, non-
seaworthy vessels, cross into Greek territorial waters under perilous conditions (Figure 
2). The tactic used by the smugglers is either to drag vessels with immigrants into Greek 
 2
territorial waters and then abandon them as asylum seekers or to accompany them, 
pretending that they are also migrants.  The Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) is quite often 
one step behind in pursuing smugglers due to the lack of early warning for ongoing 
smuggling activities, which take place in short distances and timelines. 
 
 
Figure 2. The perilous trip (From Google-Images) 
  In most cases, smugglers intend just to cross into Greek territorial waters because 
after that they are treated by the Greek Coast Guard as asylum seekers or, in extreme but 
frequent cases, as castaways according to international maritime law.  
On the other hand, this continuous unfiltered flow of illegal migrants lacking 
identification documents has already caused a great impact on stability and security in 
Greece and other European Union (EU) countries (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. EU countries (From Google-Images) 
 Even if illegal immigration is an issue of primary concern for the Greek state, the 
particularities of the Aegean Sea, and especially the lack of timely information and the 
extremely short time available for response, makes the mitigation of potential smugglers 
a very tough issue. Apart from possible bilateral or multilateral diplomatic resolutions on 
this illegal activity, at the operational/tactical level, we can focus from the very beginning 
on the key word, “information.” A kind of network-based coastal surveillance system 
could be the source of the required information for the efficient prevention of such illegal 
activities.  
 Rapid advancements in network components, and especially in wireless 
communications and mobile data devices, have lately made possible the practical use of 
wireless networks in many current military and law enforcement applications in a variety 
of environments, even in that of the archipelagic Aegean Sea.  The research performed at 
the Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX) program within the 
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Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the extended experimentation under the framework 
of the Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)/Tactical Network Topology (TNT) test 
bed can contribute decisively to the design and development of such a network-based 
maritime surveillance system.   
B. VISION 
 My vision involves placing a border surveillance system on the most critical 
islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea (Lesvos-Chios-Samos-Cos-Rhodes in Figure 4), based 
on the network technology already developed and applied by the CENETIX/TNT test 
bed. 
 
Figure 4. Eastern Aegen Sea and territorial water line (From Google-Images) 
 This synthesized system should be able to enhance maritime situational 
awareness, thus preventing unauthorized border crossings, reducing the number of illegal 
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immigrants losing their lives in the Aegean Sea, reducing cross-border crime, and 
generally making law enforcement forces more efficient and productive in conducting 
their missions. 
 To this end, I imagine a system capable of providing 24/7/365 early warning of 
suspect vessels in the cross-border zone (Figure 5) for use by the Coast Guard in order to 
achieve perpetual vigilance and leading at least to a visible deterrent to potential 
perpetrators.  
 
Figure 5. Cross-border zone  
 In parallel, such a system should be suitable not only for autonomous local use, 
but also to share a common real-time surface picture through an Aegean islands mesh 
network developed around the central node of the Hellenic Coast Guard Command and 
Control (C2) Coordination Center in Athens.  
 Taking into account the specific environment of the Aegean Sea and regarding the 
synthesis of such a system, I consider that the network would be comprised of 
subsystems able to provide electronic early warning of small vessels by maritime 
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surveillance radar sensors and identification capabilities by electro-optical (EO) sensors 
for all weather conditions during both night and day. Regarding the mesh network, I find 
that it should be capable of circulating a live data stream (video, voice, etc.) in real-time 
or near-real-time. 
 Going further, such a system could be used as the core infrastructure for 
enhancing law enforcement and expanding maritime operational capabilities in cases 
such as search-and-rescue (SAR) operation, interdiction of drugs and weapons 
smuggling, natural and man-made disasters, port security, legal fishery enforcement, 
cleanup of dumping and accidental spills, and information collection for databases about 
illegal actions and their actors, etc. 
 Moreover, the value added by expanding such a mesh network to mobile nodes 
(aboard Coast Guard vessels) could greatly enhance the capability of an on-scene 
commander for any maritime incident in the region. At the end of the day, I consider that 
such an integrated system presents a challenging prospect, since it can serve as a potential 
force multiplier with time and cost savings in manpower and tasking. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
 This research is being conducted to aid in the creation of a network-centric system 
sited on the Aegean Sea islands, intending to provide early warning capabilities and real-
time maritime domain awareness to the Hellenic Coast Guard, for the timely interdiction 
of smuggling activities. 
 The ultimate goal is to identify a viable application and network configuration 
made by low-cost commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) elements that will suit the Hellenic 
Coast Guard’s organizational needs in the maritime environment for use during law 
enforcement missions. 
This research will also have the added benefit of being the base for any further 
similar applications on countering illegal activities and/or developments for all kinds of 
exploitation in the area of the Aegean Sea. 
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D. RESEARCH TASKS  
 The first task is to design the architecture of a tactical network-centric system for 
early warning, situational awareness, and timely interdiction of smuggling activities in 
the Eastern Aegean Sea. The second task involves identifying the feasibility of and major 
constraints associated with the operational usage of such a network-based early warning 
system. 
E. SCOPE  
The overall scope of this thesis is to design the architecture of a tactical network-
based early warning system capable of enhancing situational awareness within maritime 
smuggling routes between the islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea and the Turkish 
shoreline.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
1. Studying the results of applying networks and sensors to MIO in previous 
experiments and recorded case studies. 
2. Analyzing the requirements for a network-based early warning system for 
countering illegal immigration in the Aegean Sea. 
3.  Setting the requirements and specifications. 
4.  Designing the system’s architecture.  
5.  Conducting the application’s simulation test. 
6.  Analyzing results and presenting conclusions.   
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I includes all the introductory 
material regarding the motivation, scope and methodology behind the thesis field 
experimentation. Chapter II summarizes the theoretical background on basic terms and 
concepts regarding networking in the realm of surveillance and the relevant 
experimentation conducted by the NPS/CENETIX.  It also includes a brief presentation 
of networked surveillance systems applied in the real world.  Chapter III analyzes the 
system’s requirements, specifications and architecture design.  Chapter IV describes the 
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network model architecture and a simulation test of its applicability. Chapter V presents 







II. NETWORK CONFIGURATION 
A. NETWORKS OVERVIEW 
1. Computer Networks 
A computer network is a group of computers, servers, switches, routers, printers, 
scanners, and other devices that can communicate with each other and share information 
over some transmission medium. When the medium is radio waves or infrared signals 
instead of wires, it is called a wireless network.  
2. LAN 
 A local area network (LAN) is a computer network that spans a relatively small 
area. Most LANs are confined to a single building or group of buildings. However, one 
LAN can be connected to other LANs over any distance via telephone lines and radio 
waves. A system of LANs connected in this way is called a wide area network (WAN).  
The following characteristics differentiate one LAN from another:  
¾ Topology refers to the geometric arrangement of devices on the network. 
For example, devices can be arranged in a ring or in a straight line.  
¾ Protocols are the rules and encoding specifications for sending data. The 
protocols also determine whether the network uses a peer-to-peer or client/server 
architecture.  
¾ Media refers to how the devices are connected. Devices can be connected 
by twisted-pair wire, coaxial cables, or fiber-optic cables. Some networks do without 
connecting media altogether, communicating instead via radio waves. 
LANs are capable of transmitting data at very fast rates—much faster than data 
can be transmitted over a telephone line—but the distances are limited and there is also a 
limit on the number of computers that can be attached to a single LAN. (LAN, n.d.) 
3. MAN 
A metropolitan area network (MAN) is a data network designed for a town or 
city. In terms of geographic breadth, MANs are larger than LANs but smaller than 
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WANs. MANs are usually characterized by very high-speed connections using fiber-
optic cable or other digital media. (MAN, n.d.) 
4. Mesh Network 
 Also called mesh topology, mesh is a network topology in which devices are 
connected with many redundant interconnections between network nodes.  In a true mesh 
topology, every node has a connection to every other node in the network (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Mesh network topology (From Wikipedia site) 
 There are two types of mesh topologies: full mesh and partial mesh.  Full mesh 
topology occurs when every node has a circuit connecting it to every other node in a 
network. Full mesh is very expensive to implement but yields the greatest amount of 
redundancy, so in the event that one of those nodes fails, network traffic can be directed 
to any of the other nodes. Full mesh is usually reserved for backbone networks. Partial 
mesh topology is less expensive to implement but yields less redundancy than full mesh 
topology. With partial mesh, some nodes are organized in a full mesh scheme but others 
are only connected to one or two other nodes in the network. Partial mesh topology is 
commonly found in peripheral networks connected to a full meshed backbone. (Mesh, 
n.d.) 
 NPS students J. Klopson and S. Burdian summarize in their thesis (Klopson & 
Burdian, 2005) the following regarding wireless mesh networking: “The biggest 
advantage of mesh networking is that it decentralizes the network infrastructure.  In a 
client-server configuration, every node on the network must access a common server. 
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With a standard wireless access point, every node accessing the system must share the 
bandwidth provided by that single access point. The great benefit of a mesh topology is 
that the nodes communicate with each other instead of having to reach all the way to the 
access point itself. This has several advantages. First, the network can grow exponentially 
larger than a single access point network since nodes that are too far away from the 
access point can still remain connected to the network by “hopping” through nearby 
peers. Second, nodes are generally not limited by a single point of failure; they must be 
within range of several other nodes, so if one goes down, they can simply route through 
one of the other nearby nodes. Third, limited bandwidth improves as more nodes are 
added since the additional nodes each take on a share of the work, the opposite of a 
standard single access point network in which each computer added further subdivides 
the shared bandwidth.”   
5. Basic IEEE 802.11   
The terms “802.11” and “802.11x” refer to a family of specifications developed 
by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) for wireless LAN 
(WLAN) technology. The 802.11 type specifies an over-the-air interface between a 
wireless client and a base station or between two wireless clients.  The IEEE accepted 
these specifications in 1997.  
There are several specifications within the 802.11 family.  For example 802.11g 
applies to wireless LANs and is used for transmission over short distances at up to 54 
megabits per second (Mbps) in the 2.4 gigahertz (GHz) bands but, in general, provides 
moderate throughput at moderate ranges. (802.11, n.d.) 
6. Basic IEEE 802.16  
Commonly referred to as WiMAX, 802.16 is a specification for fixed broadband 
wireless MANs that use a point-to-multipoint architecture.  Published in April 2002, the 
standard defines the use of bandwidth between the licensed 10 GHz and 66 GHz 
frequency ranges and between the unlicensed 2 GHz and 11 GHz frequency ranges and 
defines a media access control (MAC) layer that supports multiple physical layer 
specifications customized for the frequency band of use and their associated regulations. 
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The 802.16 specification supports very high bit rates in both uploading to and 
downloading from a base station for distances up to 30 miles to handle such services as 
Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity, Voice over IP (VoIP), and time-division multiplexing 
(TDM) voice and data. (802.16, n.d.) 
7. OFDM 
 Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is a frequency division 
multiplexing (FDM) modulation technique for transmitting large amounts of digital data 
over a radio wave. OFDM works by splitting the radio signal into multiple smaller sub-
signals that are then transmitted simultaneously at different frequencies to the receiver. 
OFDM reduces the amount of crosstalk in signal transmissions. OFDM technology is 
used in 802.11a WLAN, 802.16 and WiMAX. (OFDM, n.d.) 
8. VPN Tunneling  
A virtual private network (VPN) is a data network having connections that make 
use of public networking facilities.  The VPN part of a public network is set up 
“virtually” by a private-sector entity to provide public networking services to small 
entities.  With the globalization of businesses, many companies have facilities across the 
world and use VPNs to maintain fast, secure, and reliable communications across their 
branches. 
 VPNs are deployed with privacy through the use of a tunneling protocol and 
security procedures.  A tunnel is a connection that forms a virtual network on top of a 
physical network.  In computer networking, a tunnel resembles a telephone line in a 
public switced telephone network.  VPNs typically rely on tunelling to create a private 
network that reaches across a public network.  Tunneling is the process of encapsulating 
packets and sending them over the public network. (Mir, 2007)  
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B. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS (WSN) 
1. Key Terms and Definitions 
¾ A sensor is a transducer that converts a physical phenomenon, such as 
heat, light, sound or motion, into electrical or other signals that may be further 
manipulated by other apparatus. 
¾ Network topology is a connectivity graph where nodes are sensor nodes 
and edges are communication links.  In a wireless network, the link represents a one-hop 
connection, and the neighbors of a node are those within the radio range of the node. 
¾ Routing is the process of determining a network path from a packet source 
node to its destination.  
¾ Geographic routing is the routing of data based on geographical attributes 
such as locations or regions. 
¾ Collaborative processing involves sensors cooperatively processing data 
from multiple sources in order to serve a high-level task. This typically requires 
communication among a set of nodes. 
¾ Task may refer to either high-level system tasks, which may include 
sensing, communication, processing, and resource allocation, or application tasks, which 
may include detection, classification, localization, or tracking. 
¾ Detection is the process of discovering the existence of a physical 
phenomenon.  A threshold-based detector may flag a detection whenever the signature of 
a physical phenomenon is determined to be significant enough compared with the 
threshold. (Dahlman, Parkvall, Bovik & Beming, 2009) 
2. WSN Concept 
The concept of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is based on the combination of 
radio communication, processing and sensing, which raises the possibility of   thousands 
of potential technological applications.  The key advantage of WSNs in general is their 
ability to match the difference between the remote physical world and the virtual domain 
by gathering useful data from the first and sending them to the other for processing and 
analysis. The scope of networked sensors is to enhance sensing capability.  
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 One of the major categories of such applications is that of surveillance and 
security sensor networks.  This kind of network is comprised of a number of wireless 
linked nodes placed at fixed sites in a specified geographical area responsible for 
continuously monitoring for any intrusion or abnormality.  
3. Sensor Node  
A typical sensor node consists mainly of a sensing unit, a processor with memory, 
a power unit and a wireless transceiver component.  All the processes within the sensor 
node are synchronized by a local clocking and synchronizing system.  The analog signals 
produced by the sensors, based on the observed event, are converted to digital signals by 
the converter and then fed into the processing unit.  The processor performs certain 
computations on the data and, depending on how it is programmed, may send the 
resulting information out to the network.  
4. Communication Link Node 
A communication node has the ability for bidirectional or multidirectional (mesh) 
linkage with any other node within a specific distance from it.  The link breaks if the 
node moves to a distance greater than that. 
5. NOC 
A network operations center (NOC) is the physical space from which a typically 
large telecommunications network is managed, monitored and supervised.  The NOC 
coordinates network trouble reporting; provides problem management and router 
configuration services; manages network changes; allocates and manages domain names 
and IP addresses; monitors routers, switches, hubs and uninterruptible power supply 
(UPS) systems that keep the network operating smoothly; manages the distribution and 
updating of software; and coordinates with affiliated networks.  NOCs also provide 
network accessibility to users connecting to the network from outside of the physical 
office space or campus. (NOC, n.d.) 
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6. Clustering in Sensor Networks  
The term clustering in sensor networks is used to describe the partitioning of a 
region being sensed into equally loaded clusters of sensor nodes.  A cluster in a network 
resembles a domain in a computer network.  Different types of sensors can also be 
deployed in a region forming a cluster network with irregular topology.  Communicating 
nodes are normally linked by a wireless medium, such as radio.  Several clusters can be 
interconnected to the base station; each cluster contains a cluster head responsible for 
routing data from its corresponding cluster to a base station. (Mir, 2007)  
7. Real World Surveillance Sensor Networks Case Studies 
a) City-Wide Video Surveillance and Remote Monitoring for City in 
 Mexico 
Challenge: To monitor traffic flow and improve security for a large 
tourist population, a state in Mexico installed 350 traffic cameras in select locations 
throughout the capital city.  Laws protecting Mexico’s historic buildings prohibit even 
the government from disrupting the surrounding soil or attaching equipment to the 
exterior of the city’s historic architecture, necessitating a wireless closed-circuit TV 
(CCTV) network.  This would require the highest modulation and lowest latency possible 
in a single sector to keep the maximum throughput available for a clear video image.  
Any delays in the transfer of data can make a catastrophic difference in a police 
investigation. 
Solution: A broadband wireless CCTV network infrastructure was 
recommended with connection speeds up to 108 Mbps using Redline’s AN-80i, mounted 
on utility poles already in place throughout the city.  The coverage radius was defined 
according to a propagation study that enabled complete coverage of every phase of the 
project and compensated for line-of-sight (LOS) issues that are common in urban areas. 
Result: The surveillance network provides greater safety for the city’s 




gives public safety officials a constant, live bird’s-eye view of activity in bus stops, on 
street corners and in traffic to provide early detection of suspect activity and emergency 
scenarios. (Redline Communications, 2010a) 
b) Turkish National Police with City-Wide Video Surveillance 
Challenge: The police in Kutahya City, Turkey, required a reliable, 
secure, low-cost and high-bandwidth network for their 24-hour city-wide video 
surveillance project.  The project entailed the deployment of multiple video surveillance 
cameras throughout the city of Kutahya.  Deploying the high-capacity surveillance 
network posed a challenge due to interference of urban obstacles, which necessitated the 
use of many non-line-of-site (NLOS) network links. 
Solution: The Redline Company recommended the installation of a 
broadband wireless communication system (RedMAX™ WiMAX) able to provide secure 
and reliable high-speed connections in NLOS conditions.  
RedMAX base stations were deployed throughout the city along with 
RedMAX SU-Os (Outdoor Subscriber Units).  Redline’s AN-80i products were used to 
backhaul the connection to police headquarters (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Redline’s video surveillance network topology in Kutahya City, 
Turkey (From Redline Communications site) 
Result: The Turkish police can now depend on a reliable high-speed 
network for improved video surveillance and enhanced public protection.  Three 
RedMAX base stations were installed to achieve city-wide wireless coverage to connect 
the police department’s video surveillance system. Coverage of 17 km x 7 km has been 
created and achieved through the installation of base stations in Kutahya. Within this 
area, 35 surveillance cameras, both pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) and fixed, and three license plate 
recognition systems on three separate highways with 12 fixed cameras have been 
deployed.  The central monitoring system for the network is situated at the local police 
station (EGM).  Each RedMAX base station is connected by an AN-80i backhaul link.  
The EGM base station location consists of one RedMAX AN-100UX sector controller 
connected to two 60degree antennas. Four movable cameras (2.5 Mbps/camera) are then 
connected to this sector controller at EGM through four SU-Os located at an average 
distance of 2.5 km (1 LOS and 3 NLOS).  The second site, Local, houses a base station 
that consists of three AN-100UXs, two with one 60-degree antenna each, and the third 
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with two 60-degree antennas.  Fixed and nomadic cameras are connected through 13 SU-
Os (most of them NLOS) and once again backhauled to EGM via Redline’s AN-80i.  The 
third site, Germiyan, is connected to EGM via a relay site.  The base station at Germiyan 
transmits to a RedMAX SU-O on the relay site, which, in turn, is connected to EGM via 
an AN-80i backhaul unit. (Redline Communications, 2010a) 
c) Homeland Security Network-Enabled, Great Lakes Wide-Area 
 Radar Surveillance 
Sicom Systems, Ltd. develops low-cost radar surveillance solutions, which 
are well-suited for addressing international border security (IBS) missions and critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) missions.  They provide all-weather, day-night, situational 
awareness with automated, advance warning of possible terrorist or smuggling threats.  
As a result of post-9/11 security threats, these capabilities are particularly needed along 
the extensive waterways bordering Canada and the United States. 
Sicom’s Accipiter Radar is a low-cost, network-enabled, digital radar 
solution that can provide effective, wide-area radar surveillance in and around large 
bodies of water. Shore-mounted radar has a visual LOS that can survey thousands of 
square kilometers of lake surface.  The entire western half of Lake Ontario is within radar 
coverage.  Alerts and situational awareness information can be communicated to a central 
monitoring site (CMS), where they can be integrated using data fusion software to create 
an overall picture for use by authorities.  Alerts can be designed to provide warning of 
potential asymmetric threats directed towards large vessels on the water, suspicious 
activity, or perimeter breaches associated with shoreline critical infrastructure. 
Several advantages using Accipiter technology are apparent.  Automated 
detection and tracking advantages result from the use of Sicom’s proprietary radar signal 
processing and tracking algorithms.  The Accipiter display provides real-time situational 
awareness through the use of specially designed overlays of processed radar and map 
information.  A geographic map shown on the bottom layer with processed radar plan 
position indicator (PPI) imagery overlaid in such a way that returns from the surrounding 
shorelines are clearly visible in yellow color.  Radar detections (plots) from the current 
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scan are shown as green circles on the water.  Several track symbols are shown along 
with track labels.  Plots and tracks are uniquely time-stamped and maintained in a track 
database so they can be archived indefinitely as well as communicated in real-time to the 
CMS.  Plots and tracks are also geo-located in real-time so that target coordinates are 
readily available.  Target positions in local radar coordinates, map latitude and longitude, 
as well as Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates are provided.  Playback and 
reprocessing of plots and tracks at rates many times faster than real-time allow archives 
to be used for intelligence gathering, distribution, and prosecution.  Additional 
information can be obtained by contacting ACCIPITER Radar Technologies, Inc. (Sicom 
Systems, 2004) 
C. 80INPS/CENETIX/TNT TESTBED 
1. The Backbone Network 
 The current CENETIX/TNT-MIO experimentation network uses OFDM 802.16 
technology to provide a long-haul link, enabling high-bandwidth connectivity up to 54 
Mbps. The test bed, as shown in Figure 8, enables a multiplatform plug-and-play 
environment for emerging sensor, unmanned vehicles, and decision maker networks, in 
which a terrestrial long-haul wireless network is deployed by the OFDM  backbone, and 
further extended by unmanned aerial vehicles  (UAVs), air balloons, light reconnaissance 
vehicles (LRVs) on the ground, unattended sensors, and mobile operations centers.  It 






Figure 8. OFDM backbone of NPS Tactical Network Topology test bed (From 
CENETIX site) 
2. The Stationary Network 
For the creation of the stationary part of the existing 802.16 wireless TNT 
network, several pairs of Redline Access Nodes-50 (AN-50e) were used.  The AN-50e 
consists of an IP-enabled high-frequency radio and outdoor transceiver capable of 
providing a long-haul 802.16 wireless link between stationary nodes.  Thus, the extension 
of a terrestrial network from NPS (Monterey) to Nacimiento Lake for the needs of 
CENETIX and its collaborative centers became feasible, as shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. NPS/CENETIX OFDM backbone (From CENETIX site) 
 Each radio is mounted on permanent communication towers in LOS distances 
which provide the point-to-point signals transmission (Figure 10).   Further extension of 
the network is accomplished through the use of the Internet, which bridges the San 
Francisco Bay Area with the above-mentioned 802.16 backbone.  At the end of the 
northern part, a video camera provides live video streaming from the Golden Gate area 
via the communication transceiving installations directly to the NPS/CENETIX NOC.  
Then the NOC serves as a network bridge between the NPS Intranet and the Internet. 
(Naval Postgraduate School, 2010) 
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Figure 10. Bald Mountain, CA – CENETIX’s OFDM station (From CENETIX 
site) 
3. Basic Collaborative Tools 
a) Situational Awareness (SA) Multi-Agent System 
 The software used by NPS/CENETIX regarding the situational awareness 
is the (SA) Multi-Agent System, which provides real-time video and position information 
for all participating assets and targets.  It was developed by Dr. Alex Bordetsky and 
Eugene Bourakov at NPS in 2002, and since then, it has undergone numerous upgrades to 
support the needs for SA in the modern battlefield environment.  The area of operations is 
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depicted via maps or charts as the background layer of the screen while all players are 
represented by corresponding icons. The geo-location of all players is inserted into the 
system via Global Positioning System (GPS) or manually via coordinates.  The 
operational picture is stored to the system’s database and any change in that picture 
updates the system’s data. Then the data is retransmitted to the rest of the agents in real-
time through the established network. (Klopson & Burdian, 2005) 
  Klopson and Burdian in their thesis (2005) have extensively analyzed this 
software tool and also given guidance on how to use it. 
b) GROOVE Virtual Office 3.0 
  GROOVE is the software tool used for a server-client type communication 
linkage between the elements of a network for the secure transfer of data.  CENETIX, in 
general, uses this software more for discussion, instant messaging, chatting and data 
repository functions throughout the duration of the experiments.  
  Microsoft has named this program Microsoft Share Point Workspace 
2010.  “The new name for Microsoft Office Groove expands the boundaries of 
collaboration by allowing fast, anytime, anywhere access to your Microsoft SharePoint 
team sites.  Synchronize SharePoint Server 2010 document libraries with SharePoint 
Workspace so you can access, view, and edit files anytime and anywhere from your 
computer.  Lists such as Discussion, Tasks, and custom lists are supported as well.  You 
can even synchronize Business Connectivity Services lists so access to your backend 
systems is even easier.  SharePoint Workspace 2010 ushers in an entirely new way of 
working with your SharePoint team sites”. (Microsoft, 2010) 
  For further details on Groove software, refer also to Klopson and Burdian 
(2005), in which they have extensively analyzed it, or to Microsoft’s web page for 
relevant up-to-date information. 
  In total, the use of Groove in combination with SA Agent in a wireless 
network environment has been proved by CENETIX to be versatile and valuable for the 
creation of a Common Operating Picture (COP) for the participating units.  
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4. TNT/MIO 10-02 Experimentation 
 The last NPS CENETIX experimentation took part 7–17 June 2010, under the 
title, “TNT/MIO 10-02 - Networking and Interagency Collaboration on Small Craft 
Maritime-sourced Nuclear Radiological Threat Detection and Interdiction”. The MIO 10-
2 experiment was part of a unique field experimentation campaign, which was conducted 
jointly with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).  The project recently 
became a critical part of the Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism, 
spearheaded by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office (DNDO) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).  It is a  
collaborative effort supported by United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), the United States Coast Guard (USCG),  first responders in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, the Port Authority of New York-New Jersey, the Lockheed Martin 
(LMCO) Center for Innovation (East Coast), the United States Army Aviation Applied 
Technology Directorate (AATD) at Fort Eustis (East Coast), the United States Army 
Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC), and 
overseas partners from  the Swedish Naval Warfare Center, the Swedish Defense 
Research Agency (FOI) and Viking 11 program, the University of Bundeswehr,  the 
Bundeswehr Center for Transformation, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) Maritime Interdiction Training Center in Souda Bay, Greece.  The overseas part 
of MIO 10-2 was also supported by German operators from the 1st Battalion, 10th Special 
Operating Forces (SOF) Group assigned to United States Europe Command 
(USEUCOM).  The MIO 10-2  experiment  represents  the first phase of 2010 
experimentation events, in which the NPS-LLNL team will continue to explore the use of 
networks, advanced sensors, and collaborative technology for supporting integrated 
detection and interagency collaboration to counter small craft-sourced nuclear and 
radiological threats.  
 The goal for the MIO 10-2 experiment was to extend the operational horizon for 
small craft-sourced globally distributed threat countering by exploring a set of new 
models as follows:   
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 a. Integrated detection and interdiction of small craft-sourced nuclear 
and radiological threats to US installation overseas. This included:  
¾ Network-enabled swimmer detection of small craft-sourced threats 
at overseas points of entry (POEs) (Germany, Greece); 
¾ Collaboration between US experts and overseas POE operators on 
network-controlled choke point setup, drive-by primary and secondary screening, and 
stand-off detection at high-speed pursuit (Eckernfoerde, Germany); 
¾ Modeling application of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to 
small craft screening and pursuit (US experts, POE operators) by remotely controlled 
maneuvering of POE-manned patrol boats (Eckernfoerde, Germany); 
¾ Ground tracking of illicit material transfer to US military sites, 
collaboration between US units in a foreign country, foreign operations center (FOI-
Sweden, University of Bundeswehr and US remote experts), on losing, finding, and 
tagging the ground target, resolving threat uncertainty through source detection and 
adjudication (Germany, direction North-South);  
¾ Open-waters tracking of another source transfer to the overseas 
POE, which was close to the collocated NATO and US installation sites (Mediterranean, 
Souda Bay-Greece); 
¾ Collaboration between the patrol crews from different countries on 
the target small craft tracking, choke point screening, pursuit, and interdiction, combined 
with the situational awareness transfer and UAV integration (Souda Bay, Greece,). 
b. Domestic, network-enabled experimental daily detection service 
(San Francisco Bay).  
For the first time in the MIO experimentation campaign, the NPS-LLNL team 
integrated network-enabled detection, with reach-back to experts, into the daily patrol 
activities of two Marine Police boats and USCG vessel crews.  This was provided for 
long-term observation data on daily networking and collaborative command and control 
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III. CONCEPT OF NETWORK MODEL DESIGN 
A. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
Countering illegal immigration and related smuggling activities in the Eastern 
Aegean Sea can be effectively accomplished through a well-designed network, providing 
maritime domain situational awareness and early warning capabilities to HCG forces.  
Surveillance to mitigate such illegalities must be deployed across Greece’s territorial 
waters in the Eastern Aegean on a permanent base.  The target, such as a smuggler’s 
fishing boat, is usually conducting legal activities until it crosses into territorial waters.  
Then it has accomplished its mission.  Illegal migrants are usually abandoned in the 
middle of the sea.  The need for a shore-based surveillance system aimed at detecting 
suspicious activities in the area between the Eastern Aegean Sea’s Greek islands and the 
Turkish shoreline is greater than ever.  
Taking into account the particularities of that area, it is clear that a number of 
radar sensor apparatus, capable of detecting a moving vessel with a small radar cross 
section (RCS), should be interconnected through a network base in order to provide the 
required awareness in the cross-border zone. (Nohara et al., 2005) Such sensors should 
also include EO capabilities provided by high PTZ video cameras to support the track’s 
identification process when needed.  This network of several geographically separated 
sensor nodes should be remotely controlled and collectively monitored by operators’ 





Figure 11. Cluster sensor network 
 In general, the system should be considered as a low-cost (purchase, operation 
and maintenance) practical solution based on the technologies already developed and 
successfully used by the CENETIX/TNT test bed, to cover the above mentioned needs.  
In particular, it should also meet the following specifications, requirements and 
characteristics: 
¾ Highly reliable 24/7 radar surveillance operation under all weather 
conditions with automatic detection and tracking capabilities. 
¾ User friendly, computer-based control and display, single-person operated 
with modifiable and upgradable software. (Israel Aerospace Industries Systems, 2009)  
¾ Each node to be relatively small, and easy land-mountable. 
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¾ Single composite picture from whole network area of responsibility 
(AoR), clutter-eliminating radar display including map layer background, with automated 
threat detection and modifiable alert provision.  
¾ EO capabilities on demand, in slaved and autonomous mode. 
¾ Track data to include at least heading, velocity, track history, Geographic 
Information System (GIS) positioning, and Automatic Identification System (AIS) data if 
available. (Seibert et al, 2006) 
¾ Long storage memory capability for keeping target tracks’ radar and EO 
data available for investigation, prosecution and intelligence analysis for suspect routes 
and patterns identification. 
¾ Internet connection capability for the establishment of a larger network 
through VPN tunneling as well as for further remote monitoring and control.  
B. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The requirements at each level can be described as follows: 
1. Tactical Level 
¾ Radar detection capability up to 30 km for very small RCS boats. 
¾ EO remote surveillance and identification capability for relatively long 
distances.  Infrared (IR) capabilities to be included for identification purposes.   
¾ Real-time streaming of nodes data to the head node/Tactical Operations 
Center (TOC). 
¾ Tracks to be displayed by their geo-location in real-time in order to be 
directly exploitable from the involved patrolling forces.  Data for target location should 
be also provided in several forms (azimuth-range, geographic coordinates).  
¾ 24/7 nodes maintenance checking capability from the head node.  
2. Operational Level 
¾ Cluster network connectivity for data sharing in real-time. (Nohara, 
Weber,  Jones, Ukrainec & Premji, 2008) 
¾ Security provisions in data streaming. 
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¾ SA tools for collaboration purposes between the cluster networks. 
3. Strategic Level 
¾ Future extension capability of the sensor network and connection 
compatibility provisions for different kinds of sensors. 
¾ Real-time data streaming to and from the end node through SA tools.  
¾ Security in data streaming. 
C. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATIONAL 
 DEMANDS 
1. Single Cluster Mesh Sensor Network (Tactical Level) 
The architecture of the system depends primarily on the operational demands. 
Going step by step, in order to fulfill the needs at the tactical level, we should design the 
lower level of the system as that of an autonomous cluster sensor network deployed on 




Figure 12. Island-based cluster sensor network 
  A cluster network would be comprised of sensor and communication nodes as 
well as a TOC, preferably collocated with the head node.  The sensor nodes perform not 
only the basic sensing duty, but also general purpose processing and networking.  The 
data from the sensor nodes are transmitted through each other to the head node, which 
provides the capability for presenting the sensors’ aggregated picture, data storage, 
remote control, and WAN connectivity for further extension of the network.  Thus, each 
cluster network provides the capability for situational awareness coverage on its 




Figure 13. Tactical-level network 
2. Grouped Cluster Mesh Sensor Networks (Operational Level) 
Going further and discussing the operational level and the need for a more 
collective approach to the issue, the system should be expanded by interconnecting all the 
clusters (island-based networks).  Every single cluster head node has the ability to 
cooperate with its adjacent cluster network and transfer data on targets and activities 
taking part in their respective AoRs.  In parallel, they can transfer data regarding suspect 
vessels, smugglers, and so forth.  In such a case, the overall system resembles that of an 
Eastern Aegean Sea electronic “fence” providing a common operational picture and data 
sharing to all network users and, of course, offers a more collective manipulation of the 
issue at that level (Figure 14).  This can be accomplished by the use of broadband 
technology for connecting the relaying nodes of the cluster networks through Internet 
VPN tunneling.  In such architecture, one of the TOCs serves also as the operational 
coordination center (OCC) for the whole network.  
 33
 
Figure 14. Operational-level network 
3. Nationwide Wireless Broadband Cluster Sensor Networks 
(Strategic/National Level)  
Through VPN tunneling technology or satellite communication, we can also 
extend our design to support the highest hierarchical level, that of national/strategic 
needs.  That means that we intend to provide circulation of data towards the C2 Coast 
Guard Center in Athens and vice versa.  In this way, we bring the commander together 
with the experts and specialists on the scene of any incident in real-time, providing secure 
voice, data and video streaming.  In parallel, we can extend the surveillance network to 
other areas beset with smuggling and cross-border criminal activities, such as Corfu 
Island (Figure 15).  The benefits of this networking can be shared with the Air Force and 
Navy, at least for SAR purposes.  In total, such a system could be characterized as a 
Coast Guard Nationwide Wireless Broadband Sensor Network.  
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Figure 15. National-level network 
D. NETWORKING  
1. Communicating Through Nodes 
 For the creation of an 802.16 wireless network, several pairs of Redline Access 
Nodes-80 (AN-80i) should be used (Figure 16).  According to the manufacturing 
company, Redline Communications, the AN-80i is a radio transceiver for high-
performance wireless broadband transport solutions for quickly establishing point-to-
point and point-to-multipoint links that extend the networks to great distances.  
 Operating in the license-exempt 5-GHz band, the AN-80i leverages proven 
OFDM technology to deliver industry-leading, high-speed Ethernet throughput.  With its 
exceptional long-range capabilities, the AN-80i is able to establish and maintain reliable, 
robust connectivity that can exceed 80 km (50 miles) in clear line-of-sight conditions. 
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AN-80i Specifications: 
System Capability: LOS, optical-LOS, and non-LOS (OFDM) 
RF Band: 5.725-5.850 GHz, TDD 
Channel Size: 20 MHz, 40 MHz (software selectable) 
Data Rate: Up to 90 Mbps average Ethernet rate 
Max TX Power: 20 dBm (region specific) 
Rx Sensitivity: -82 dBm @ 6 Mbps (BER of 1x10e-9) 
PoE Cable: Up to 91m (300 ft) 
Network Attributes: Transparent bridge, automatic link distance ranging, 802.3x, 
802.1p,DHCP pass-through, encryption 
Modulation: BPSK to 64 QAM (bidirectional dynamic adaptive) 
Dynamic Channel Control: ATPC 
MAC: PTP, concatenation, ARQ 
Range: Beyond 80 km (50 mi) LOS@ 48 dBm EIRP 
Network Connection: 10/100 Ethernet (RJ-45) 
System Configuration: HTTP (Web) interface, SNMP,Telnet 
Network Management: SNMP: standard/proprietary MIBs 
Power Consumption: Standard IEEE 802.3af (15.4 W 
(Redline Communications, 2010b) 
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Figure 16. Access Node AN-80i (From Redline Communications site) 
Each radio is mounted on permanent communication towers in LOS distances 
which provide the point-to-point transmission of the signals.  Further extension of the 
network can be accomplished through VPN tunneling via the Internet, which bridges 
each communication relaying node with the corresponding node of the adjacent network. 
In a similar way, a further extension can be easily achieved between the networks and the 
HCG C2 center in Athens.  
The communication link node is a single or multiple pairs transceivers entity for 
automatically transmitting the data received from the adjacent surveillance node to the 
other communication link nodes (point-to-multipoint) and/or for relaying towards the 
head of the network nodes (multipoint-to-point). In cases where it is adjacent to a 
surveillance node, it is wire-linked with the sensor node and preferably shares the same 
installations (tower and power supply).  For all cases of connectivity, LOS conditions 
between the adjacent network nodes, as well as the distance limits, are the major concerns 
for ensuring the network mesh connection and coverage. 
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2. Surveillance Via Sensors 
The surveillance node is comprised of the radar and the EO sensing unit, their 
processors, the transceiver and the power supply unit. The sensors are made up of the 
sensing subunit and the analog-to-digital conversion (ADC) unit for the transformation of 
the analog signals to digital before they are received by the processor (Figure 17).  
(Akyildiz, Su, Sankarasubramaniam, & Cayirci, 2002). 
 
Figure 17. Sensor node configuration 
In this network, the radar sensor operates in a steady-state condition and, in cases 
where a target needs to be identified; the video sensor is involved complementarily to 
support the objective.  Consequently, two ways of communication are anticipated: that of 
the inter-node between the sensors and processor and that of multi-hop wireless video 
streaming (802.16) to the head node (TOC).  The processing unit converges the sensors 
output (radar and EO) after it has passed through the ADC unit and automatically sends 
the data to the head node through the network’s chain of transceivers.  The data received 
by the data server are processed and stored and automatically provided to the operator.  
For the surface surveillance of areas which can be described as straits with limited 
dimensions, instead of closed sea, HF maritime radar may be used for automatic 
detection and tracking on low RCS vessels with high accuracy and resolution under all 
weather conditions in a cluttered environment.  
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Regarding the EO device, it should be a combination of a high PTZ camera with 
infrared capabilities in a weatherproof housing, able to aid in track identification and 
visual observation remotely, on the TOC’s officer command.  The camera is 
synergistically engaged with the radar processor.  When a target of interest is detected 
and tracked by the radar, the camera automatically focuses on this target and provides 
live video to the head node, for observation by the officer on duty.  In such a case, he 
remotely manipulates all features provided by the camera in order to improve sensing and 
acquire and optionally store the valuable video data. The video processing should also 
include a standard video compression technique (e.g., MPEG-4, MJPEG) for streaming 
towards the head node. (Little, Konrad, & Ishwar, 2007) 
The source of energy for the continuous operation of the nodes can be provided 
directly by the urban infrastructure available in cases where the nodes are deployed 
adjacent to such areas.  Otherwise, the power can be provided by solar panels or wind 
generators, both available in the Aegean Sea environment.  CENETIX’s backbone 
network infrastructure uses such alternative electrical power supplies (solar panels) in the 
Nacimiento relaying station (Figure 18). 
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Figure 18. Nacimiento, CA-CENETIX’s RN infrastructure-solar panels (From 
CENETIX site) 
3. Collaborating Through SA Tools 
 In a cluster net of surveillance sensors, the fusion node is where the aggregated 
data are received and processed through the SA tools by the controllers.  Real-time 
updates regarding the AoR are presented for viewing, analysis and alerting of the 




with the already available local HCG operational center on each island. This means that 
the officer on duty can be also charged with monitoring the aggregated picture delivered 
by the corresponding network.  
 A Data Server (DS) is the core element of the TOC’s design, since it provides 
connectivity between the end user (duty officer) and the sensor nodes.  The DS receives 
the entire target information product from all the active sensor nodes.  Subsequently, it 
stores all data for further exploitation, also allowing access for real-time monitoring and 
processing, as well as for further specific tasks, such as intelligence gathering and 
prosecution.  
 Since the TOC is the end user of the cluster network, a firewall and router should 
also be used for the extension of the network to a WAN via Internet to ensure security, 
availability and integrity of the data.  In addition, the accessibility of the server’s data 
should be provided only through encryption techniques and authorization procedures 
(Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19. Head node configuration 
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IV. ISLAND-BASED SURVEILLANCE NETWORK (CLUSTER) 
A. NETWORK TOPOLOGY/TOPOGRAPHY 
The whole network of islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea should be comprised of 
five autonomous peripheral networks with its corresponding TOCs located in their capital 
cities.  For simplification, we will focus on a single cluster sensor network design, based 
on the island of Lesvos, also known by its capital’s name, Mytilene (Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20. Lesvos island cluster sensor network 
 Mytilene, as an island, is considered to be one of the major entry points into 
Greece for the smuggling networks.  With distances varying from 8 to 15 kilometers from 
the Turkish shoreline, and also taking into account the equidistant territorial middle line 
in the channel, the reaction time is limited for HCG crews (Figure 21).  
 42
   
Figure 21. Lesvos island topography 
 Therefore, the topology of such a sensor network should be oriented towards 
these straits.  An AoR can be designated and assigned for that surveillance network, as 
represented in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22. Lesvos cluster network AoR 
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 Consequently, to cover this AoR, the sensor nodes should be mounted on the 
northern and eastern parts of the island facing the opposite shoreline.  The number of 
surveillance sensors needed for sufficient coverage of the corresponding AoR is no more 
than four since both the ranges required and the radar surveillance capabilities satisfy the 
needs and, in some cases, there is overlapping coverage.  
 It is preferable that all sensor nodes (SNs) are close to the urban facilities of a 
village or town in order to receive the required electrical power and to have physical 
protection and ease of accessibility for maintenance purposes.  A provision for CCTV 
capability can also contribute to the remote surveillance of the node facility itself, as well 
as for deterring any potential “visitors”. 
 The head node, which should be facilitated by the already available HCG TOC in 
the island’s capital, Mytilene, will serve as the information fusion center of the network 
(Figure 22).  The data extracted from the sensors are routed to a sensor data server which 
automatically stores and distributes them to the network monitoring station in the TOC.  
Apart from monitoring, analyzing and alerting through the workstation, a provision for 
administrative and remote maintenance capabilities for the system is also provided.  
 Taking into account the dimensions, the geo-morphology and also the orientation 
of the island towards the AoR, as well as the location of Mytilene and the need for LOS 
between the adjacent network nodes, we proceed to the following network deployment 
architecture.  Mytilene’s sensoring network model should be comprised of four sensor 
nodes.  
The specific locations for the network’s deployment are the following (Figure 23): 
¾ SN 1: Mithymna (N 39°22'25, E 26°11'22- Elev.12m) 
¾ SN 2: Tsonia (N 39°22'27, E26°21'50- Elev.15m) 
¾ SN 3: Mytilene (N 39° 6'32, E26°33'51- Elev.36m) 
¾ SN 4: Fteli (N 38°59'14, E26°32'26- Elev.35m) 
The distances among the nodes are as follows: 




Figure 23. Lesvos model network surveillance coverage 
 To complete the backbone of the Lesvos network, we should specify the number 
and the locations of the relaying nodes (RNs) needed for the interconnection of the entire 
system.  In a case where the island has only flat-terrain morphology, given the relatively 
short distances between each node, we would not need an RN at all.  Unfortunately, 
Lesvos has rocky terrain morphology, as most of the Aegean islands do, making the need 
for RNs profound.  By specifying the minimum number of RNs needed for the creation of 
this link, and their exact locations, we can present the basic feasible architecture for an 
operable surveillance network but with no or limited redundancy (Figure 24).  That 
means that to achieve full redundancy through full or almost full mesh networking, we 
should add more RNs.  
 Trying to specify the fundamental network design of the Lesvos network, we 
proceed to the network’s simulation through a software application named the Systems 
Planning Engineering and Evaluation Device (SPEED), created by Northrop Grumman 
for United States Marine Corps (USMC) operational communication needs.  
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Figure 24. Sensor network of limited redundancy 
B. NETWORK’S COMMUNICATION SIMULATION TEST (SPEED)  
 SPEED is a fully integrated system for generating, storing, and disseminating 
communications information.  SPEED provides rapid communications planning and 
support for maneuver warfare in rapidly changing tactical environments.  SPEED also 
provides communications planners and spectrum managers at all levels with a set of tools 
that can be used to perform a wide range of communications planning, radio frequency 
(RF) engineering and spectrum management functionality to support the tactical 
environment.  Among several others, SPEED includes the Point-to-Point (PTP) Analysis 
Tool, which provides point-to-point communications analysis, engineering, and planning 
of the very high frequency (VHF), ultra high frequency (UHF) and super high frequency 
(SHF) radio bands.  It evaluates the performance of any network configuration of 
 46
connected transceivers, provides two-dimensional terrain profile displays between the 
connected transceivers, and provides a powerful and graphical set of tools for optimizing 
the performance of these systems. 
 The point-to-point analysis now contains a quality of service (QoS) analysis that 
uses the path loss determined from a Terrain Integrated Rough Earth Model (TIREM) 
and other user selectable parameters to determine the energy per bit-to-noise power 
spectral density (Eb/No) ratio, carrier- to-receiver noise (C/kT) ratio, carrier-to-noise 
(C/N) ratio, and theoretical bit error rate (BER) values for that particular digital link.  The 
theoretical BER is calculated using an approximated Q-function from the Eb/No and C/N 
values.  The BER is a statistical measurement of the probability of errors in the digital 
signal, and is therefore used to determine if the link is considered to be acceptable or 
unacceptable. 
 The PTP Analysis Tool contains default settings that determine how the analysis 
will be performed.  The Default Point-to-Point Analysis Interval dialog displays the 
default values for the interval between the collection of elevation points.  The finer the 
analysis is, the better the resulting product will be.   
  A minimum of two radios operating with the same modulation type and frequency 
must be selected to perform a PTP analysis.  More radios can be selected if desired. 
 Performing a PTP analysis produces a link-status line connecting selected radios.  
The color of the link-status line indicates the predicted status of the link, based on the 
link parameters and the terrain-dependent signal path loss.  Each PTP link-status line 
consists of one analysis line. The analysis line connecting each radio indicates overall 
link performance in the least favorable direction. A solid green line indicates an 
acceptable predicted signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio in both directions, a yellow line indicates 
a marginal predicted S/N ratio in one or both directions, and a dotted red line indicates an 




Figure 25. Point-to-point analysis (From SPEED’s Manual) 
 A feature of the PTP tool is the capability to drag any radio connected by an 
analysis line to a new location on the map to determine the predicted status of the link 
immediately by the color of the analysis line.  Then, the PTP Analysis Tool will 
automatically re-analyze all links based on the new location. 
The PTP Analysis window enables the communications planner to view the data 
on a specific communications link and the PTP Analysis window can be used to analyze, 
optimize and plan VHF, UHF, and SHF communication links.  This window is also used 
to display the following PTP analysis information: 
¾ Terrain Profiles 
¾ Fresnel Clearance Zones 
¾ Antenna Pointing Azimuths 
¾ S/N predictions 
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¾ RSL predictions 
¾ Troposcatter Reliability predictions 
¾ Link Margin predictions 
¾ Path Loss predictions 
¾ Propagation Mode determination 
¾ SINCGARS Cosite Interference Evaluation 
 The PTP Analysis window can be entered any time, if there is at least one link 
connection on the World Map or Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Mapsheet 
window.  
 The terrain profile display is a cross-section of the terrain along the great-circle 
path between two connected radios.  At each end of the link, the elevation of each radio is 
displayed along with the radio's antenna height.  If the path is unobstructed by terrain, an 
LOS line is drawn between the two radio's antennas.  The Fresnel clearance zones may be 
shown if LOS exists between the two radios.  The terrain elevation points displayed are 
plotted on an earth surface that is deliberately distorted to account for atmospheric 
refractivity, which tends to bend a radio wave. (Northrop Grumman, n.d.) 
C. SPEED’S APPLICATION FOR SIMULATION OF LESVOS NETWORK 
 Taking into account that the topography of the radar surveillance nodes (SNs) is 
relatively unique for the coverage of the Lesvos AoR, we deduce that the interconnection 
via OFDM link between the nodes can vary from a full mesh network to just a simple 
serial one.  Since the criterion of distance (max 37 km) is not going to impact the 
network’s performance, then it is up to studying the terrain morphology for the 
establishment of the required LOS for tranceiving between the nodes. Therefore, the 
signal propagation simulation test through the SPEED application can show us the 
potential applicable Lesvos network topology and any compromises we may have on its 
deployment. 
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 To proceed to such a simulation, the system requires data for the specifications of 
the communications hardware elements (Redline’s AN-80i), the fixed locations of the 
sensor nodes as well as the digital terrain elevation data (DTED) for the island of Lesvos. 
D. RESULTS  
The simulation of the system revealed the following observations and 
deficiencies: 
¾ The morphology of the island does not allow for easily achievable links 
since great masses of mountains divide the area of deployment, precluding direct LOS 
between the peripheral nodes.  That means for achieving a mesh interconnection of the 
network, we need more than one RN to be placed between the nodes. 
¾ Taking into account the permanent locations of the two northeastern as 
well as the two southeastern sensor nodes, in accordance with their surrounding terrain, 
we deduce that the linkage can be achieved only by treating them as two different 
elements.  That means that we first managed to connect the elements of each pair with an 
RN and after that we tried to connect the two RNs with each other. 
¾ The use of that software requires thorough knowledge of the area’s terrain 
morphology and subtle manipulation of its capabilities for identifying the ideal positions 
of the network elements in the minimum possible time.  
 The outcome of that simulation test was successful for the creation of the 
fundamental basis of a cluster sensor network on the island of Lesvos, as it is depicted in 
Figure 26.   
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Figure 26. SPEED’s application outcome 
It represents the basic network OFDM backhaul, comprising four SNs and two 
RNs, required to achieve the synergy needed between the network’s elements.  The 
specific location of each of these two RNs as well as the relevant distance between each 
one of the SNs is the following: 
¾ RN1  : Argenos (N39°20'57, E26°15'38– Elev.697m) 
¾ RN2  : Akrotiri (N39° 04'54. E 26°33'14– Elev.258m) 
¾ RN1-SN1: 7km RN1-SN2: 10km  
¾ RN1-SN3: 37km RN1-SN4: 47km 
¾ RN2-SN1: 46km    RN2-SN2: 37km  
¾ RN2-SN3: 4km  RN2-SN4: 11km 
¾ RN1-RN2: 39km 
 51
Obviously, the above outcome does not provide complete meshing capability to 
the system, which means that in case of any failure of the RNs, the network is 
automatically rendered partially or totally out of order.  Therefore, for achieving mesh 
attributes in that network’s architecture, we should add one or two more RNs between the 
northern and southern nodes for further inter-linkage extension (Figure 27).  
 
 
Figure 27. Basic and optional (mesh) extension of Lesvos network architecture 
 The cost, which was set as a fundamental criterion for the development of such a 
network infrastructure, can be roughly estimated (based on the similar CENETIX 
backbone) to be US$300,000 for a six-node (2RNs + 4SNs) basic cluster sensor network, 
or US$400,000 for an eight-node (4RNs + 4SNs) partial mesh network.  Taking into 
consideration that the terrain morphology of Lesvos is the most inconvenient for 
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deploying such a network, it is apparent that the rest of the major islands will require less 
extensive and consequently less expensive infrastructure than Lesvos.  
 Nevertheless, in trying to evaluate the potential feasibility of such a proposed 
system and identifying the major constraints of its establishment and operation, the 
following estimations were considered:  
¾ The already existing technological background and the available information 
technology (IT) accessible in the open market, as well as the expertise of the personnel of 
the relevant companies, means that the development of the system is realistically 
achievable.  To that end, the available simulation tools can ensure, through reliable and 
relatively inexpensive testing, each step toward the gradual accomplishment of such 
project. 
¾ Also concerning the factor of operational feasibility, such a system can be 
measured in advance, since it satisfies the requirements set at the design phase and seems 
to be capable of providing the necessary assistance to law enforcement authorities for 
countering smuggling activities in that area.  
¾ Considering the autonomous operation of this surveillance system and the already 
proven reliability of similar systems (e.g., CENETIX’s OFDM backbone), we can state 
that it is a very competent and cost-effective solution.  An extra economic benefit from its 
use is the indirect savings in personnel and manpower through the network-based 
management of HCG forces, while, on the other hand, they are able to carry out their 
duties with enhanced efficiency.  
¾ All things considered, and having in mind the island’s terrain morphology factor 
and the fine software manipulations needed for designing the topology of the network, it 
is illustrated that the major constraint on the feasibility of such project would be mainly 
centered on that the terrain factor.  To that end, a preliminary site survey of the specific 
area by IT experts could reveal all relevant data and associated restrictions that may 






 The deployment of an island-based autonomous wireless sensor network, as 
designed and presented above, and its applicability proven by Northrop Grumman’s 
SPEED simulation test, for surveillance purposes on the Eastern Aegean Sea islands is 
believed feasible.  It involves Redline communications technology, a manufacturer of a 
wide range of OFDM equipment, which is also successfully used by the NPS/CENETIX 
TNT test bed, to provide an OFDM 802.16 long-haul link, enabling high-bandwidth 
connectivity.  
The composite (Radar+EO) sensor network which was described herein provides 
wide-area surveillance through monitoring and tranceiving real-time video, voice and 
data streaming at a relatively affordable cost.  It generates situational awareness as well 
as the alerts needed to HCG forces for any kind of threat or maritime incident. Thus, it 
contributes decisively at least to saving more lives, either on illegal immigration cases or 
in other ones, and there can be no doubt that its operation dissuades potential smugglers 
from their intentions.  
Considering that each cluster network requires no more than one person (the 
officer on duty) to monitor and exploit operationally, it can save workload and serve in 
general as a force multiplier.  In addition, the construction of the overall network 
elements is somewhat covert and limited in dimension, making the need for building 
extra installations relatively unnecessary.  
It is obvious that setting up just the first island-based network, for instance that of 
Lesvos would be the wisest base step for the creation of a whole set of clusters, enough to 
cover all the “fragile” area of the Eastern Aegean Sea.  The feedback on its operability 
and efficiency, once it is settled, can contribute greatly to any further deployment of the 
collaborative environment, thus ultimately resulting in a gradually enhanced surveillance 
and security capability in that region. 
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B. OTHER APPLICATIONS 
 With no doubt, such a system can be used for similar purposes in riverine and lake 
environments, port surveillance, security of littoral military facilities, monitoring for 
illegal fishing and oil spilling, and so forth.  But, apart from maritime surveillance for 
illegal activities, the major contribution is that of the enhancement of the SAR capability 
for each area of coverage.  Any single vessel voyage is archived in the main data server 
from the first until the last trace-contact, thus making the SAR mission much easier.  In 
parallel, through the network’s coverage, all HCG maritime forces are under positive 
control, thus enhancing their overall management as well as their safety.  
 Taking into account the advances in sensor devices and wireless radio 
communication technology, the resulting design provides a platform for multipurpose use 
and exploitation even beyond mitigating smuggling activities.  Such a terrestrial long-
haul wireless network backbone can give the opportunity for further extensions of the 
network, mainly by mobile nodes aboard HCG vessels carrying special sensors for 
detecting nuclear materials, drugs and so forth.  Similarly, it can be linked with UAV 
assets for detached surveillance purposes, SAR and even for wider range maritime 
operations.  
 Additional exploitation of these expanded mobile capabilities can nowadays be 
easily achieved through the establishment of a secure; two-way; voice, picture, and video 
data stream in real-time between capital-metropolitan centers and remote sites-islands, 
thus “transferring” the decision makers and the experts onto the real tactical theater.  The 
parallel use of modern biometric technology by the patrolling forces can also contribute 
to an advantageous synchronized collaboration via wireless interconnection with the 
command post, based on a related smuggling networks database.  Such guidance and 
support for the ongoing missions can certainly lead to more secure and fruitful conduct of 
law enforcement operations. At the end of the day, the humanitarian aspect can be 
effectively serviced by such infrastructure, a lesson which has already successfully taught 
and learned by the deployment of CENETIX’s network for the relief of Hurricanes 
Katrina’s homeless people.  
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